It is true in the Cohen generic extension of L, the constructible universe, that every countable ordinal-definable set of reals belongs to L.
One may expect such a result of any homogeneous forcing notion. For instance, Theorem 1 is true for the Solovay model (the extension of L by Levy cardinal collapse up to an inaccessible cardinal [4] ) -but by a different argument. One hardly can doubt that any typical homogeneous extension (Solovayrandom, Sacks, Hehler, and the like) also satisfies the same result, but it's not easy to manufacture a proof of sufficient generality.
On the contrary, non-homogeneous forcing notions may lead to models with countable OD non-empty sets of reals with no OD elements [2] , and such a set can even have the form of a Π 1 2 E 0 -equivalence class [3] .
Proof. Let C = ω <ω be the Cohen forcing. First of all, it suffices to prove that (it is true in
Indeed, as the Cohen forcing is homogeneous, any statement about sets in L, the ground model, is decided by the weakest condition.
There is a formula ϕ(x) with an unspecified ordinal α 0 as a parameter, such
, and then there is a condition p 0 ∈ C such that p 0 ⊂ a and p 0 C-forces that {x ∈ ω ω : ϕ(x)} is a countable set. Suppose to the contrary that X ⊆ L, so that p 0 also forces
is the interpretation of a C-name t by a real x ∈ ω ω . Let T ∈ L be the C-name for {t n [ȧ] : n < ω}. Thus we assume that p 0 forces
whereȧ is the canonical name for the C-generic real. Letȧ lef ,ȧ rig be canonical (C × C)-names for the left, resp., right of the terms of a (C × C)-generic pair of reals a lef , a rig . 
Corollary 3. It is true in
Proof. By the elementarity, this holds in M. Further we have π(t n ) = t n and π(T ) = T because the names t n and T belong to the transitive part of M.
By the countability, there is a real z ∈ ω ω ∩ L satisfying z(j) = 0 for all j < dom p 0 and C-generic over M, so that M[z] is a set in L. Let x ∈ ω ω be C-generic over L, with p 0 ⊂ x. Then, as z ∈ L, the real y defined by Remark 6. Is Theorem 1 true for other popular forcing notions like e. g. the random forcing? The proof above crucially employs the countability of the Cohen forcing.
